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DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS AND THE GETTIER EXAMPLE * 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT.  
 
This paper challenges the first Gettier counterexample to the tripartite account 
of knowledge. Noting that 'the man who will get the job' is a description and 
invoking Donnellan's distinction between their 'referential' and 'attributive' 
uses, I argue that Smith does not actually believe that the man who will get 
the job has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's ignorance about who will get the 
job shows that the belief cannot be understood referentially, his ignorance of 
the coins in his pocket shows that it cannot be understood attributively.  
An explanation for why Smith appeared to have justified true belief is given by 
distinguishing between 'belief' and 'belief in truth'. Smith believes the 
sentence 'the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket' to be true 
(he mistakenly believes that Jones will get the job, of whom he knows that he 
has ten coins in his pocket) (hence his 'belief'), the sentence is true (hence 
'truth'), and he has sufficient reason to assent to it (hence his 'justification'). 
But he does not believe the proposition expressed. Hence he does not know 
it either.  
                                                          
* Unannotated quotations are from Gettier (1963). All italics are as in the originals unless 
otherwise stated.  
'JTB' is used as an abbreviation for 'justified true belief', 'KJTB' as a shorthand for the thesis 
that knowledge is justified true belief, a.k.a. 'the tripartite account' (of propositional 
knowledge).  
The fundamental structure of this paper emerged from discussions with Thomas Uebel who 
deserves my special thanks and gratitude. I also thank for critical comments, help, 
suggestions and support: Chiara Baroni, Richard Bradley, Craig Callender, Jean-Michel 
Delhotel, Peter Dietsch, Hanspeter Fetz, Edmund Gettier, Till Gruene, Matthias Hild, Jennifer 
Hornsby, Jeffrey Ketland, Genoveva Martì, Michela Massimi, Christopher New, Deniz Ogretir, 
Misò Polak, Emiliano Trizio, Paul Schweinzer, Max Steuer, Scott Sturgeon, Susan Watt, John 
Worrall, and audiences at the LSE and the University of London Graduate Conference in 
Epistemology 2000, in particular my commentator Ann Whittle, and Miguel Fernandez, 
Michael Gabbay, Dave Levy, and Gabriel Segal.  
I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Arts and Humanities Research Board of 
Britain and the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method of the London School 
of Economics. 
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I. INTRODUCTION. 
 
The 'Gettier counterexamples' (Gettier 1963) represent a most interesting 
episode in modern epistemology. They redefined the boundaries and ground 
rules of what came to be known as 'post-Gettier' epistemology. In a three-
page paper— to my knowledge, Gettier's only publication — the author 
presents counterexamples to a position labelled the 'tripartite' account of 
knowledge. This was said to hold that knowledge consisted of 'three parts', 
namely,  
1) justification,  
2) truth,  
3) belief.  
Knowledge is nothing but justified true belief (JTB), according to this account. 
Although it has never really become clear who the main proponents of this 
epistemological doctrine were supposed to be, and who precisely Gettier 
meant to attack, post-Gettier epistemology was founded by the — supposed 
— demonstration that not every instance of justified true belief constitutes 
knowledge. The three conditions of the JTB account of knowledge, therefore, 
were deemed to be insufficient and felt to need amendment.  
 
The path epistemology has adopted since 1963 is surprising. The tripartite 
account, while ridiculed and rejected outright1, is arguably still presupposed in 
some of the more recent accounts of propositional knowledge. The tripartite 
account, while clearly insufficient, is still considered to represent some of the 
necessary conditions for knowledge. In the years following the publication of 
Gettier's seminal paper, a variety of 'fourth' conditions were presented. 
Suggestions were that Gettier had put his finger on the importance of the 
presence of relevant falsehood in the chain of justification, or of the 
defeasibility of the justification, or of the reliability of the justification, or of the 
causal connection between knower and known, or some such (see Dancy 
1985, 2.3). The charm of Gettier's paper consisted in the fact that after it, it 
seemed very clear indeed that something was missing, but it was utterly 
mysterious what was missing. The suggestions were as diverse as they could 
have been.  
 
I want to examine Gettier's first example, leaving the second, and others, for a 
more comprehensive examination later. I argue that his example fails to 
establish the desired conclusion. Gettier's first example is the Gettier 
example, so a rebuttal of this ought to be considered more important than the 
rebuttal of any other similar examples. Another famous case, that of Lehrer's 
(1965) 'Nogot-Havit' scenario, will also be covered here.  
 
                                                          
1 For some notable exceptions, see the discussion in footnote 19 below.  
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Gettier's example is this:  
Smith is justified in believing that Jones will get the job they have both applied 
for, and he also has a justified and true belief that Jones has ten coins in his 
pocket.2 So apparently Smith's belief in the following would be justified: 
(1)   The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. 
But should, unexpectedly, Smith himself get the job, and should he himself 
coincidentally and unbeknownst to him have ten coins in his pocket too, (1) is 
true, even though one proposition from which it had initially been deduced is 
false. 
Now apparently  
1. (1) is true,  
2. Smith believes it, and   
3. Smith is justified in believing it.3  
The three conditions for knowledge as justified true belief seem satisfied. Yet, 
Gettier continues, certainly this is not an instance of knowledge since Smith's 
belief "is true in virtue of the coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not 
know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in [(1)] on a 
count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man 
who will get the job."  
 
My approach is conventional in that I hold that the conditions of the tripartite 
account are not in fact satisfied in this example; it is original in that I claim to 
show that the condition violated is the belief condition. If Smith does not 
believe that  
(1)   the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket  
it should not be surprising that he does not know it either (presuming that 
knowledge requires at least belief). Indeed, the apparent force and generality 
of the example is precisely derived from the fact that Gettier's stipulations 
already preclude belief, and therefore true belief. A fortiori they also preclude 
justified true belief. But this, of course, cannot refute the tripartite account, 
since for a refutation of that a case of justified true belief that is not knowledge 
would have to be presented.   
 
                                                          
2 Gettier nowhere affirms that Smith believes the conjunction of these beliefs: 
(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket,  
although he asserts that Smith has "...strong evidence..." for it (contra the discussion 
between Thalberg (1969, 1974) and Hooker (1973), also Saunders (1972)). Nothing hangs 
on this here since the counterexample is based on another belief.  
3 The 'Principle of Deducibility of Justification' (PDJ) asserts that "for any proposition P, if S is 
justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of 
this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q." My argument does not need to question this 
principle. Deductive closure of beliefs is not required by the tripartite account. Also see 
Cohen (1992, §§5, 6). 
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My analysis fundamentally relies on the use of the distinction between 
'attributive' and 'referential' uses of definite descriptions introduced by 
Donnellan (Donnellan 1966). The term 'description' was famously examined 
by Russell in his (1905) paper On Denoting. Russell argued that expressions 
such as 'the King of France' (more generally, 'the F') are not singular terms, 
even though they might appear thus. For instance, since Tony Blair is the 
present Prime Minister, using the singular term 'Tony Blair' instead of 'the 
present Prime Minister' will not change the truth value of any sentence. One 
could think that these expressions are essentially identical. Russell showed, 
however, that this grammatical similarity (the two expressions are 
interchangeable salva veritate – as far as truth is concerned) is not reflected 
in the logical structure of these sentences. He claimed that sentences such as 
'the F is G' really need to be represented as a conjunction of three 
propositions:  
1) there is something that is F,  
2) nothing else is F, 
3) this thing is G. 
Symbolised in first-order logic (using the obvious symbolisation key) this 
becomes:  ' x (Fx &  y (Fy Æ y=x) & Gx)' (there exists something such that 
that object is F, and for everything, if that object is F, then it is the first object, 
and that object is G) . This way of looking at expressions such as 'the F' gives 
statements containing such expressions fundamentally different truth 
conditions than subject-predicate statements such as 'Tony Blair is G'. 
Formally, the latter can be represented by a constant standing for Tony Blair, 
't', say, and the predicate symbol G, i.e. 'Gt.' This is true if and only if Tony 
Blair is G, whereas the other statement is true if the following three conditions 
are satisfied: someone is Prime Minister, nothing else is Prime Minister, and 
that person is G. Although these two are both made true by Tony Blair, the 
latter would still be true had someone else than Tony Blair been Prime 
Minister and G. (For a more comprehensive introduction see Neale 1990).   
 
Russell's analysis was challenged by Donnellan in 1966. According to 
Donnellan, 'the F' in a statement of the form 'the F is G' (here: (1) 'the man 
who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket') can be used in two different 
ways. First, it can be used attributively — in order to attribute the property of 
G-hood to whatever object satisfies the description (is the F); secondly, it may 
be used referentially, serving as one contextually adequate way of 
establishing reference to an independently identified object with the intention 
of making an assertion about that object, namely, that it is G. Yet Russell's 
analysis only applies to the attributive use. For instance, a sentence like 'the 
candidate getting the absolute majority of votes wins the election' displays an 
attributive use of the description 'the candidate getting the absolute majority of 
votes', since it is true, and meant to be true, irrespective of who this person is. 
Typically such a use supports the addition of 'whoever this may be' after the 
description, as this sentence does. By contrast, if at a cocktail party I exclaim 
that 'the man drinking martini is wanted at the telephone', I will be understood 
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to be using the description 'the man drinking martini' to pick out some 
particular person (I might in addition look in his direction). This is an instance 
of the so-called 'referential' use, in which the description is merely used to 
establish reference.    
 
Donellan makes a number of assertions about these two uses which are not 
relevant here. For instance, my use of this distinction as a device to exhaust 
the range of possible readings of Smith's alleged belief does not commit me 
to accepting the well-disputed claim, that has its origin in Donnellan's paper, 
that descriptions are semantically ambiguous.4 'Russellians' claim that what is 
expressed by an utterance of a sentence containing a description is not 
ambiguous.  It is always a general and never a singular proposition. However, 
to explain the undeniable phenomenon of the referential use of descriptions it 
is admitted that the speaker might have meant (to express) something 
different than what he actually did express. I take it that in such cases the 
speaker means what he believes; nothing more is required here since we are 
interested in what Smith actually believes rather than what he would express 
if he were to make an utterance. 
 
Following this distinction, I take beliefs involving descriptions to have the 
following truth conditions:5 if the description is intended referentially, the belief 
is singular, and the object referred to figures in it as 'constituent'. It is true iff 
this object is G.6 Understood attributively, as in Russell's original account,7 it 
                                                          
 
4 For analyses of these two uses of descriptions also see Bach (1981, 1987), Evans (1982), 
McCulloch (1989), Neale (1990), Recanati (1989), Reimer (1998a, b), Sainsbury (1979), 
Searle (1979).  
5 The attributes of 'referential' and 'attributive' primarily apply to utterances. In this context, I 
use 'referential belief' as shorthand for 'the belief Smith would have if his (hypothesised) 
utterance of the sentence involved a referential use of the description'. Analogously for 
'referential proposition'. Some of this terminology will be revised later on.  
6 Donnellan (1966) controversially claimed that sometimes reference can occur to the object 
intended independently of whether it actually is the F. Kripke (1977) presented the argument 
that reference is a pragmatic rather than a semantic phenomenon in such cases. This debate 
is tangential to my argument – see section 2. 
7 Bach (1987, 99 n.12) claims that Russell himself "suggested that descriptions can be used 
as names..., i.e. referentially" in (1918, 246). The passage he quotes actually occurs in 
Russell (1919, 211 f. in Martinich (1996)). Russell says in discussing that in some contexts 
names ('Scott') can be used as descriptions ('the person named 'Scott''): "This is a way in 
which names are frequently used in practice, and there will, as a rule, be nothing in the 
phraseology to show whether they are being used in this way or as names. When a name is 
used directly, merely to indicate what we are speaking about, it is no part of the fact 
asserted...it is merely part of the symbolism by which we express our thought." Bach seems 
to suggest that, according to Russell, descriptions could analogously function as names, but 
no further evidence is given to support that claim. For a further discussion of this see Reimer 
(1993). Russell's (1957) reply to Strawson (1950) clearly shows that he did not see 
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has to be analysed as an existential statement (i.e. as:  x (Fx &  y (Fy Æ 
y=x) & Gx)), and that is true iff there exists some object that is both the unique 
F and also G. This object, however, does not enter the truth conditions of the 
thought that would also be true if in its stead some other object had been both 
the unique F, and G. In such cases the semantic contribution of the 
description to the utterance in which it occurs is not the object it denotes, but 
the quantificational structure.  
 
Now, to know (or believe) that the F is G, as a referential proposition, is to 
know (believe) of the object that actually is the F that it is G.8 To know 
(believe) an attributive proposition instead is to know (believe) that there 
exists some object — the identity of which one need not have any opinion 
about — such that this object is both the unique F and G.9 Note that in the 
attributive case the agent sets up a mental relation between the two 
properties of F-hood and G-hood (the 'the' securing uniqueness). Both of 
these cases can properly be reported as 'knowing that the F is G'.  
 
My methodological leitmotiv, finally, is the question what exactly it is that 
Smith believes but does not know. Given Donnellan's distinction, it is easy to 
see how Gettier's example is less explicit on this point than it might have been 
since 'the man who will get the job' — a description — may be used 
attributively or referentially with these readings expressing fundamentally 
different beliefs. What does Smith believe?  
 
My argument for the conclusion that there is no belief that Smith entertains 
that could yield a counterexample to KJTB will proceed as follows. The next 
section records that the belief expressed in (1) cannot properly be understood 
as referential to Smith because of Smith's ignorance of both his new job and 
the coins in his pocket. Referential to Jones, the belief is irrelevant. Section 
III. is based on the intuition that Smith does not have to believe/know that he 
will get the job for him to be able to believe/know that the man who will get the 
job has ten coins in his pocket, even if that should turn out to be him. Hence 
his ignorance of this fact does not provide sufficient explanation for his 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Strawson's examples to pose any original problems to his account. Plausibly, 'the King of 
France is bald' is (meant to be) 'referential' rather than 'attributive'. 
8 This plausibly rules out knowledge of 'the F is G' in the Donnellan case where the object 
referred to is not actually the F. 
To require that it is known that the F is the F seems too strong as in some contexts, 
knowledge could rightly be reported by using a description the knower is not aware of being 
applicable to the object; analogously with names. Also see Hornsby (1977). 
9 The attributive case still allows for knowing of the F that it is G, where 'of the F' is 
understood to mean 'of the F as such', i.e. of the object that is the F as satisfier of the 
description. To know of the candidate with the most votes that she will win does not imply that 
it is known who, which physical person, will win. Analogously is it possible to 'have that object 
in mind'. 
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ignorance of (1). This explanation is provided in section IV where I argue that 
Smith's ignorance about the coins in his pocket explains why he does not 
know (1), since it shows that he does not even believe it. In section V I further 
argue that if Smith were not thus required to know about the coins to believe 
(1), then he could also have known it — but we concurred with Gettier that 
Smith does not know. The counterexample is analysed in sections VI through 
VIII. I explain the reader's reasoning about what Smith could believe in 
section VI.  
 
An intuitive distinction between believing a proposition and believing a 
sentence to be true is introduced in sections VII and VIII. This distinction is 
used to explain the mechanism of the 'counterexample': Smith has sufficient 
reason to believe the sentence (1) to be true (he has 'justified' 'belief' in its 
truth) and indeed (1) is true (his 'belief is true'), but Smith does not believe 
any of the propositions expressed by it. Yet this is what the tripartite account 
requires. The dissolution of the example concludes the paper. Lehrer's 
(Lehrer 1965) 'Nogot-Havit' case exhibits exactly the same confused use of a 
description ('someone in my office owns a Ford') and will be referred to in 
footnotes at the appropriate stages of the argument. 
 
The scope of this paper is mainly critical rather than constructive. I am 
convinced that a number of Gettier-type examples can be helpfully analysed 
using the distinction between belief and belief in truth. However, as there is 
no hard and fast way of showing that some hypothesised agent lacks a belief 
he is assumed to have, a wholly general argument to the invalidity of Gettier-
type cases along these lines is impossible. However, the most famous and 
seemingly most compelling Gettier example actually turns on this distinction, 
and, by also relying on the 'ambiguity' of a description noted by Donnellan, it 
provides a particularly neat point of entry for my argument.  
 
 
II. THE REFERENTIAL READING: SMITH DOES NOT BELIEVE IT. 
 
Let us first look at the referential reading. Following Donnellan, 'the man who 
will get the job' could, in this context, be used either to refer to Smith, to whom 
it applies, or to Jones, to whom it does not apply. Only the former reading is 
interesting here.10 Yet we are told that Smith has been informed that Jones is 
the person to whom the description applies, and that Smith neither believes 
that he himself will get the job, nor that he has ten coins in his pocket. That is, 
ex hypothesi, Smith does not believe of the man who will get the job (the 
                                                          
10 In the latter case (1) could be rendered as: 'Jones has ten coins in his pocket', since Smith 
takes Jones to be the man who will get the job. This belief is justified and true, possibly even 
knowledge. However, we would not ordinarily want to report this belief using (1) since we 
know that Jones does not get the job – but a report of (1) will typically be understood to imply 
the adequacy of the description. Also see Hornsby (1977).  
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object) that he has ten coins in his pocket, since that is him. Surely, if the 
intended reading of (1) is such that it involves either the belief that Smith (the 
man) is the man who will get the job, or the belief that the man who actually 
will get the job (the object: Smith) has ten coins in his pocket, there could not 
be a counterexample to KJTB, as Smith does not even have any of these 
beliefs. 
 
But note that this ignorance is already (part of) Gettier's explanation why 
Smith does not know (1) which is true "in virtue of the coins in Smith's 
pocket." This indicates that Gettier might have intended the description to be 
read as referential to Smith. But note too that Gettier also seems committed 
to attribute knowledge of (1) to Smith in case Jones would have got the job — 
the description thus being read as referential to Jones.11 These observations 
will matter later. 
 
 
III. THE ATTRIBUTIVE READING: SMITH COULD HAVE KNOWN,  
           IF ONLY HE HAD BELIEVED. 
 
I hope the reader shares my intuition that Smith could, in principle, both 
believe truly, and also know (without prejudicing the relation between these 
two states) that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket 
without knowing or believing that he will be that man. In particular, he could 
truly believe/know this if either someone else were actually the man who will 
get the job, and Smith truly believed/knew of this man that he had ten coins in 
his pocket; or alternatively, he could truly believe/know this even if he himself 
should get the job (and were ignorant of this as here he is), in case he 
believed/knew that whoever will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. A 
possible, yet hypothetical, reason for this might be that all candidates had 
actually been asked to bring ten coins to the interview, and Smith knew of 
this. Such a belief can be represented as an attributive belief, which under a 
Russellian analysis (Russell 1905) is an existential statement of the form: 
(2)  x (x will get the job &  y (y will get the job Æ x = y) & x has ten coins in 
his pocket) 
 
We do not know of any evidence like the above in Gettier's case, a prima 
facie reason to think that Smith does not hold such a belief. On the other 
hand, it seems precisely such a statement that Smith deduces initially, and 
the 'Principle of Deducibility of Justification' (PDJ) granted, such a belief 
would be equally justified. But the fact, which I grant, that Smith would be 
justified in believing (2) by the PDJ does not suffice to show that Smith does 
believe (2). Nor does Gettier say or explicitly assume that Smith believes (2); 
the only thing Gettier says is that Smith believes (1). Do we have any further 
                                                          
11 You are right in objecting that (1) would no longer be "true in virtue of the coins in Smith's 
pocket" in such a case. See the subsequent argument.  
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evidence to determine whether Smith actually believes (2)? Would anything of 
interest follow from the supposition that he does believe it? 
 
If Smith could believe or know (2) without believing that he will get the job, the 
fact that he does not believe that he will get the job is not conclusive evidence 
for his not knowing (2). (2), however, is just a way of reading (1) and thus 
Smith could know (1) despite this ignorance. But we said that Smith does not 
know (1). What follows is that the fact that Smith does not know (1) is not 
sufficiently explained by the fact that he is ignorant about himself satisfying 
the description, since independently of that he could still believe and know 
(2). Everyone of course agrees that Smith does not know (2) since if he did 
he would know (1) as well.  
 
This is just to say that the candidate with the most votes (the actual person) 
does not have to believe/know that she herself is the candidate with the most 
votes in order to know that the candidate with the most votes wins the 
election.  She knows this since these rules were adopted to select a winner —
others might have been — and they apply to whoever will turn out to be the 
candidate with the most votes. Conversely, to be ignorant of the fact that the 
candidate with the most votes wins the election, it is not enough just to be 
ignorant about which person actually is the candidate with the most votes. 
That Smith has an additional and mistaken belief about who gets the job is 
irrelevant for this attributive belief;12 and accordingly the answer to: 'of whom 
was Smith thinking in believing (2)?' would have had to be: 'of no-one in 
particular'.  Existential statements, in the logical sense, never refer to any 
object.  Most people, however, would add, hesitantly, that Smith does have 
Jones 'in the back of his mind' in some sense. This intuition is, to my 
knowledge, practically universal. This tends to push us back to the referential 
reading, for if we want to render these facts in a single belief, (1) cannot be 
understood as (2), but must rather be understood referentially — to Jones. On 
the other hand, Smith's ignorance about who gets the job would only have 
mattered had (1) been intended, first, referentially rather than attributively, 
and secondly, referentially to Smith.  But Smith does not even have either of 
these beliefs (as shown in the preceding section). The reason for this 
presented above was, of course, this very ignorance.13  
                                                          
 
12 See Russell (1919, 213), Bach (1981, 220) or Wettstein (1981, 46) for examples. Russell 
(1918, 234) says that "... you sometimes know the truth of an existence-proposition without 
knowing any instance of it ... Existence propositions do not say anything about the actual 
individual ..."   
13 The Lehrer (1965) case is relatively weaker, as Thalberg (1974, 351) notes, since many 
people may own a Ford, but only one person can get the job: "Lehrer's evidence that Nogot 
owns a Ford in no way rules out the owning of a Ford by Havit; whereas in the Gettier 
situation, ... [Smith's evidence for the belief that Jones will get the job] counted against the 
hypothesis that Smith would be hired." Lehrer could easily have believed that Havit owns a 
Ford too, given that he believes that Nogot does, but Smith could not, at pain of 
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We have thus reached a situation in which both referential and attributive 
readings lead to an impasse. As of yet, there is no counterexample: Smith 
does not have the referential belief, and assuming he has the attributive belief 
his ignorance of who gets the job would not have mattered for knowledge of 
(1). It seems that the coins are required to resolve this problem. But let us first 
make sure that the three conditions of KJTB are indeed satisfied. Since we 
took for granted that (1) is true, that Smith would be justified in believing (1) 
(as (2), by PDJ), the natural next step is to ask whether Smith actually 
believes (2). I will argue that he does not.  
 
 
IV. THE ATTRIBUTIVE READING CONTINUED:  
            BUT HE COULD NOT HAVE BELIEVED IT. 
 
Smith quite uncontroversially does seem to hold belief (2) as he appears to 
perform an existential generalisation on his initial belief. On the other hand, a 
conclusive reason why Smith does not seem to hold such a belief is that he 
does not know about the coins in his pocket. This is the piece of the puzzle 
we neglected in the preceding section. It seems that in order for him to 
believe that whoever will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, knowledge of 
the coins is required since, logically, either of Smith or Jones could get the 
job. I want to argue that unless Smith believes of himself that he has ten coins 
in his pocket he cannot plausibly be understood to believe that whoever will 
get the job has ten coins in his pocket, given that he is well aware of the fact 
that he could get the job.14 Since he does not know about the coins in his 
pocket, he does not believe (2), nor, thus, (1).  
                                                                                                                                                                     
inconsistency, have believed that he will get the job, given that he believes that Jones will get 
it since there is only one job: the uniqueness of the job establishes the uniqueness of the 
object satisfying the description in the Gettier case. See Kuhn (2000) on embedded definite 
descriptions. 
Thalberg continues: "we are not so reluctant to agree that Lehrer's evidence for [Nogot works 
in Lehrer's office and Mr. Nogot owns a Ford] carries over to ... [there is an x such that x is an 
officemate of Lehrer's and x owns a Ford]", i.e. the attributive reading. Thalberg is mistaken 
here, it is simply less counterintuitive to assign this attributive belief to Lehrer since there is 
little implicit information as to who this someone who has a Ford must be (a belief that 
several people in one office drive the same type of car seems more plausible to have than 
the belief that whoever will turn out to get some specific job has ten coins in his pocket). In 
the Gettier case, the asymmetry comes in with knowledge of the coins in Jones's pocket. 
Since Thalberg only questions the justification of the beliefs rather than the beliefs 
themselves, he is lead to weaken his position in order to accommodate for this intuition. 
14 I am not claiming that Smith must not have any view on who will get the job – clearly he is 
convinced that Jones will. But if Gettier wants to claim that his belief is true because he gets 
the job, and Smith himself would say that his belief was true because of him getting the job, 
then Gettier's argument equally requires that the possibility of Smith getting the job is not 
excluded by Smith. In that aspect our claims do not differ.  
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The argument for this claim will be further justified in the next section, but the 
underlying intuition is this. If you claim to believe something of some 
unspecified element of a set of things (but of no element in particular, i.e. 
'attributively'), then, unless you think that what you know serves to determine 
this element (the coins serving to determine who will get the job), you will 
have to believe of all the elements whatever you claim to believe of this 
unspecified element for your claimed belief to hold up as belief, rather than 
just as a claimed belief, that is, a belief that you claim to have but do not 
actually have.15  
 
A fresh example may help to illustrate this. Suppose I told you that I believe 
that the next person to leave the room we are both in has painful cavities. 
How would you determine whether I am not trying to fool you as to what I 
believe? You would reason as follows. Either he has have a belief about who 
(which person) is the next person to leave the room, and specifically believes 
of that person that she has painful cavities (the referential reading), or he 
believes that whoever will be the next person to leave the room has painful 
cavities (the attributive reading). In the latter case, either he believes that i) 
the next person to leave the room will be asked to leave the room because 
that person has painful cavities (the description picks out the object) — such 
a case may arise in a dental clinic which prioritises treatment according to 
pain — or he believes that ii) the next person to leave the room has painful 
cavities because all people in the room have painful cavities.  Such a case 
may arise in a dental clinic which specialises in painful cavities.  
 
In such situations my claim would be entirely plausible. But if I simply told you 
that I believe that the next person to leave the room has painful cavities and 
none of the above circumstances actually obtained (say we were sitting in a 
lecture theatre, following a course in epistemology, or maybe we are in a 
dental lab, but you know that I neither believe i) nor ii)), you may justifiably 
wonder why I should say that I have this belief, and whether I actually believe 
what I claim to believe. My insisting that I really really do believe this is not 
good enough for me to actually have this belief rather than just claiming to 
have the belief; nor should this be good enough evidence for you to ascribe 
this belief to me. 
 
My argument here mirrors Gettier's (implicit) reasoning for his claim that 
Smith does not know (1).  Just replace know for believe in what follows to get 
Gettier's version: in order to believe (2), that is, that whoever will get the job 
has ten coins in his pocket, Smith has to believe that whoever could get the 
job has ten coins in his pocket.  Both Jones and Smith could get the job, but 
Smith only knows of Jones that he has ten coins in his pocket, thus, Smith 
                                                          
15 It is also possible to believe to have a belief (and thus claim to have that belief) without 
actually having the belief.  
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does not believe of whoever could get the job that he has ten coins in his 
pocket. It follows that he does not believe that whoever will get the job has ten 
coins in his pocket — he could not, since for that he would have to believe it 
of himself as well. Hence he does not believe that the man who will get the 
job has ten coins in his pocket, whoever that may be. 
 
So, that Smith does not know about the coins in his pocket is not the reason 
why he does not know (2) even though he does justifiably and truly believe it. 
It is the reason why he cannot even believe (2). The right explanation, then, of 
why Smith does not know (1) is not to be found in the insufficiency of the 
tripartite account of knowledge, it is simply that he does not even believe it, 
and belief is required for knowledge. In other words, what is wrong with (1) is 
that it cannot be read as a (justified) true belief of Smith, not that it cannot be 
read as knowledge. That follows trivially (presuming that knowledge requires 
belief).16  
 
 
V. THE ARGUMENT JUSTIFIED. 
 
In this section I provide further independent justification for the above 
argument by showing that its essential premise must be presupposed in 
Gettier's story. So let us assume, for the purpose of the argument, that it were 
                                                          
16 Lehrer (1965, 170, and 1979, 74ff) relies on the similar ambiguity of 'someone' by having 
the belief  
(*) 'someone in my office owns a Ford'  
first derived from 'Nogot...owns a Ford', then from both the preceding and 'Havit...owns a 
Ford.' In the latter case the belief is more difficult to be read referentially since several 
instances are involved as basis of the belief. 'Someone' does not, as 'the man...' does, imply 
uniqueness of the object satisfying the description.  
Since Lehrer considers this belief true because Havit has the Ford it was not attributive (that 
would be false, and Lehrer does not believe it either) but referential. Lehrer, however, has "no 
evidence that [Havit]...owns a Ford" (1965, 170), and that was already supposed to be the 
counterexample to KJTB. If this is not evidence enough for the supposition that Lehrer does 
not believe that Havit owns a Ford (i.e. no counterexample since no referential belief), 
suppose that he did believe it – then he could also have known it despite of this ignorance 
(see below).  
Ironically, Lehrer himself considers a similar scenario in his second case, where he believes, 
in addition to Nogot having the Ford, that Havit as well has a Ford, and his belief in (*) is true 
(and knowledge) by Havit having the Ford (again Nogot does not have it). However, since 
this time Lehrer has derived his belief from the two instances it surely would have had to be 
considered equally true (and knowledge) in case Nogot, instead of Havit, had had the Ford, 
i.e. it needs to be understood attributively ("whoever is in my office..."). Attributively, however, 
the belief is false since only Havit has the Ford, but both Havit and Nogot are in the office, 
and it is thus not an instance of knowledge at all, contrary to what Lehrer claims. It would 
have been knowledge had it been referential to Havit, but that is inconsistent with it being 
based on both of the above statements. Also see Almeder (1975, 59). 
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not required that Smith had to know of the coins in his pocket to have the 
belief (2). And it seems indeed that without believing of himself that he has 
ten coins in his pocket it generally is still possible for Smith to believe that the 
man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket (in the attributive sense) 
even if that should turn out to be him, contrary to what I have claimed above. 
One such scenario would be the following.  
 
Suppose that this time the board consists of numerologists and Smith is told 
that they specifically decided to select the candidate who carries ten coins 
(they think ten is a magic number in business). Suppose further that, just as in 
Gettier's story, the person thus selected was Jones, and that Smith knew of 
this and of the coins in Jones's pocket too, but not, of course, of the coins in 
his own pocket. Smith comes to believe that the man who will get the job has 
ten coins in his pocket (so far, this belief is as ambiguous as in the original 
Gettier story). Since he thinks he himself does not have ten coins in his 
pocket he is equally surprised when he learns that he will get the job. He also 
must have carried ten coins all along. What a surprise. The company used a 
metal detector. 
 
In such a case Smith could believe (1) attributively despite ignorance of the 
coins in his pocket (as long as he is ignorant about who actually gets the job). 
But under these circumstances, one is not barred from saying quite literally: 
'Smith knew that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket', 
continuing with 'he just did not know that that man would be him', and/or with 
'he just did not know that he had ten coins in his pocket' and thus to attribute 
knowledge of (1) to Smith. That is to say, by not requiring that Smith has to be 
aware of the coins in his pocket it is actually possible to attribute belief and 
knowledge of (1) to Smith. Of course additional knowledge of the coins in his 
pocket would not turn that piece of knowledge into ignorance either. So, in 
addition to the irrelevance of the ignorance about who gets the job, whether 
Smith knows about the coins in his pocket or not really does not matter for the 
attributive belief either, provided Smith actually believes (2) as here we 
assume he does. But clearly Gettier does not want to attribute knowledge to 
Smith under any circumstances and he requires Smith to know about the 
coins to have knowledge of (1). Even if Smith did know that he will get the job 
still he would not know (1) because of that.  
 
The point is not that in scenarios as the above one must attribute knowledge 
to Smith.17 Many things may still go wrong. The point is rather that whatever 
else could go wrong, the one thing that definitely would not matter is Smith's 
knowledge of the coins. For instance, one might continue the above scenario 
by letting the members of the board change their mind such that to have ten 
coins in the pocket would no longer even be a necessary condition to get the 
                                                          
17 Miso Polak suggested this perspective to me. This section was substantially revised due to 
searching criticisms of Ann Whittle. 
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job, although Smith is not told this and continues to believe (2), and that 
instead the best qualified person would be chosen (Smith, as it happens), 
who, by accident, carries ten coins too (as does Jones). Then arguably Smith 
need not be said to know that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his 
pocket, although of course this belief is still true since whoever could be 
chosen does carry ten coins.  
 
That such examples can be fabricated ad nauseam is well known. But these 
do not jeopardise the present argument since such cases can occur 
regardless of whether Smith knows of the coins in his pocket or not. In such 
examples, Smith does not know (1) whether he initially knew about the coins 
in his pocket or not. This, of course, is just the reverse side of my above 
argument where I said that he could know (1) independently of whether he 
knows about the coins in his pocket or not. The point is that ignorance of the 
coins is not a guarantee for his not knowing (1), just as knowledge of the 
coins does not by itself entail his knowing (1). However, in Gettier's example it 
is undoubtedly the ignorance of the coins in his pocket which precludes Smith 
from knowing, since if he did know about the coins he could know (1) too. But 
given the preceding analysis the fact that the coins do matter for Smith's 
attributive belief in Gettier's story is entirely mysterious so far unless you 
accept my interpretation.  
 
If you accept that ignorance of the coins does not show that Smith necessarily 
does not know (2), nor that knowledge of them implies knowledge of (2), as 
surely you have to, then it can no longer simply be stipulated that Smith does 
believe (2) and would know (1) in case he knew about the coins. Independent 
argument is now required to establish that Smith does believe (2) in the first 
place since we know that ignorance of the coins in his pocket does not suffice 
to show that he does not know (2) if he did believe (2), as Gettier wants us to 
believe. (Ignorance about who will get the job does not matter anyway since 
the belief is attributive). We need a good reason to think that in this case, 
ignorance about the coins in his pocket suffices to establish that Smith does 
not know, as we all want to say, since it does not do so generally (given belief 
in (2)).18 My analysis provides this reason, whereas Gettier's story provides 
none.19    
                                                          
 
18 This is not the same thing as finding a fourth condition for knowledge which could explain 
this ignorance. Gettier needs some argument prior to this (which should not beg the question 
against KJTB) supporting the claim that Smith is ignorant because of his ignorance of the 
coins.  
Of course, Smith might in addition violate some fourth condition. Yet it always seemed that 
Smith's ignorance of job and coins were meant to be symptoms of the violation of the fourth 
condition. 
19 New (1965, 1968) was the first to doubt Gettier's story and got abrasive replies from 
Harman (1966) and Smith (1966). Thalberg (1969) sees the ambiguity of 'the man who will 
get the job', but questions Smith's justification only, and is criticised by Coder (1970), 
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To recapitulate, my claim is not that in all those cases in which Smith actually 
has the attributive belief (2) he also knows (1). My claim is that in all those 
cases in which he does not know (1) because of ignorance of the coins, as in 
Gettier's story, Smith does not have the attributive belief which, if he did know 
of the coins, he could have, and which could (but need not) be knowledge. 
The reason is that this ignorance would be irrelevant to knowledge of (1) 
either way if he actually did have the attributive belief. Gettier's reasoning 
here might have been something like this. If Smith had not been ignorant, he 
could have had the justified true belief, which could have been knowledge, if 
Smith had not been ignorant. But since he is, it is not. QED. But this is 
fallacious.   
  
 
VI. HOW THE EXAMPLE WORKS. 
 
The counterexample proceeds in two steps. To fully explain this two further 
beliefs need to be introduced. Supposing that Russell's theory of descriptions 
has not entered the subconscious of most readers of this example the 
description in Smith's alleged belief (1) will usually be understood as applying 
'referentially' to either Jones or Smith in the first instance. The reader is thus 
faced with two possible readings of (1) representable as: 
(3) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his 
pocket, or 
(4) Smith is the man who will get the job, and Smith has ten coins in his 
pocket. 
Note that (1) can be taken to paraphrase (3) from Smith's perspective (who 
"...sees the entailment [of (1) from (3)] ... and accepts [(1)] ..."), and to 
paraphrase (4) from the reader's perspective, but not vice versa. Unlike 
Smith, the reader has the correct information about who will get the job, and 
also knows that Smith has ten coins in his pocket. Smith himself clearly does 
not believe (4) while he seems to believe (3).  
 
So Smith neither has justified true belief in (3) (which is false) nor in (4) 
(which he does not believe). But then, the reader rightly wonders, how could 
he have justified true belief in (1)? Thus in the second step the attributive 
belief (2) enters the scene as the third and last possible reading of (1) and is 
then adopted by elimination. The common understanding is that Smith 
believes (2) but does not know (1), the reason for this ignorance being that he 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Saunders (1972) and Hooker (1973), also see Richman (1975) and Fitch (1976). Hooker 
(1973) first mentions Donnellan (1966) in this context. Thalberg (1974) replies, and is further 
criticised by Shope (1983, 31), who refers to Donnellan in the construction of other examples 
(1983, 67, 107). Another critic of some of the assumptions underlying the Gettier example is 
Almeder. See in particular his (1974), Hoffmann's (1975) comment and Almeder's reply 
(1976), and a further restatement of his position in his (1985) and (1992).  
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neither knows about his ten coins nor about the job he is about to get. But if 
Smith actually did believe (2), I argued above, none of this need matter for 
knowledge. But clearly here it does. My conclusion was that Smith, for the 
same reason for which he does not believe (4), does not believe (2) either — 
the coins in his pocket. This explains why his ignorance matters and the 
counterexample is dissolved.  
 
The rationale behind the common reading is somewhat twisted, deriving from 
the overriding desire to attribute some belief to Smith, and preferably a 
justified and true one at that. From the possible true beliefs (2) and (4) on 
offer (2) has major advantages over (4). As we saw above, Smith does not 
have to know that he gets the job to believe (2), but he has to in order to 
believe (4). That by itself would eliminate (4). Furthermore (2), unlike (4), is 
justified by assumption (PDJ), and, the reader goes on to think, clearly it 
cannot be contradictory to attribute a belief to Smith which he is justified to 
hold. Clearly, if already he is justified in believing (2) at the very least he might 
believe it. Nonetheless a contradiction arises from the supposition that Smith 
does believe (2). Thus it is concluded that Smith cannot know (1) despite (the 
possibility of) justified true belief in (2). What is more, the ignorance about the 
coins also affects (4) so there is really no reason to believe that Smith knows 
either of these. This conclusion is not doubted since it is anyway expected. 
 
 
VII. BELIEF AND ACCEPTANCE. 
 
The strong intuition of most people that Smith does have justified true belief in 
(1) can be explained by distinguishing belief and acceptance. Belief 
(involuntarily) relates people to propositions, while acceptance (voluntarily) 
relates sentences to people.20 Typically, sentences are accepted because 
they express propositions one believes. In such a case one accepts a 
sentence because one believes it to be true; but the proposition expressed is 
simply believed. The proper objects of propositional knowledge are 
propositions, not (the purely syntactically characterised) sentences. Thus a 
distinction must also be drawn between knowing simpliciter (a proposition) 
and knowing (a sentence) to be true.21 The latter is intuitively analysable into 
                                                          
 
20 In this aspect my account differs from earlier ones of e.g. Cohen (Cohen 1989, 1992, 
1993). His reliance on propositions for both belief and acceptance leads to obscurities since it 
is recognised that for acceptance linguistic representation is required, cf. Moore (1992). 
Clarke (1994, 146) points out that the philosophic usage of 'acceptance' diverges from 
ordinary language. 
21 At one stage Gettier writes "... Smith believes that (e) is true ...", later that "Smith ... bases 
his belief in (e) ..." (emphasis added). This illustrates that Gettier does not draw this 
distinction.  
Similarly in Shope (1983) as representing the Gettier literature: "the second condition either 
states that ... S believes p, or states that S accepts p ..." (1983, 10, second emphasis added) 
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knowing the proposition the sentence expresses and knowing that it 
expresses that proposition (of course the sentence has to be true too).  
 
Epistemology itself has nothing to do with sentences except insofar as they 
express propositions and are therefore needed to talk about knowledge. 
Whenever one attributes states of knowledge or of belief, in conversation or in 
print, there is hardly a way of doing this other than using sentences. This may 
immediately create an ambiguity but often the context will leave no room for 
misunderstandings as to whether one talks about attitudes towards 
propositions or towards the truth of sentences. When the attitude is found to 
be directed at the truth of a sentence there is the further problem of 
determining which proposition was supposed to be expressed since the 
relation of sentences to propositions need not be one-to-one. But whenever 
possible a heuristic principle of charity eliminates false sentences and deviant 
associations of propositions to sentences. The problem of ambiguity rarely 
arises on the way from propositions to sentences since everyone chooses his 
own words to express thoughts.  
 
Now, belief of a proposition expressed by some sentence and acceptance of 
that sentence (belief in its truth) do not always come hand in hand. For some 
true sentence, to believe that that sentence expresses a proposition one 
believes, and thus to believe that that sentence is true does not by itself 
guarantee that one believes the proposition actually expressed by that 
sentence. One may simply be mistaken or even completely ignorant about 
what the sentence expresses, or not even understand the language in which 
the sentence is formulated at all. Such phenomena are quite common. Thus  
there cannot be a one-to-one relation between acceptance and belief, that is, 
the 'behavioural' counterparts of sentences and propositions. So even if it is 
known that someone accepts some sentence, this does not immediately allow 
us to identify what it is that she believes since first we need to settle which 
propositions she might have taken the sentence to express, and with the help 
of further evidence we may then subsequently be able to determine which 
one of these was believed, if any. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
– but this distinction makes all the difference. For instance Lehrer (1979, 66, emphasis 
added) says that "a person may believe something for the wrong reasons, ... and, 
nevertheless, know that it is true because he assents to it for the right reasons" which seems 
backwards to me. Similarly Lehrer (1990, ch. 2). Lehrer's latest views on belief and 
acceptance are his (2000). This problematic is also well illustrated by the passages Gettier 
quotes at the beginning of his paper. 
Acceptance here is derived from belief in truth, but they need not be so related. I use 
'acceptance' because this word may sound familiar in epistemology, but the point relies on 
the difference between belief and belief in truth. See De Sousa (1971), Perry (1980), Cohen 
(1989, 1992, 1993), Sturgeon (1991), Ullmann-Margalit and Margalit (1992), and Dummett 
(1999). Some of these issues were foreshadowed in Sesonske (1959).  
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Returning to the case at hand, my claim is that in the Gettier example there is 
an ambiguity between the propositions expressed by (2), (3), and (4) as 
possible propositions expressed by (1). The unearthing of this requires the 
intuition underlying the referential/attributive distinction. Understood to 
express (2) or (4), (1) is true, but false if understood as (3). It should now be 
apparent that Smith takes (1) to express (3) and that the reader takes (1) to 
express (2) or (4). Given these beliefs of Smith, for him, belief in the truth of 
(1) and hence its acceptance is perfectly legitimate (hence the J: he is 
'justified'). So Smith accepts the sentence (1) because he believes the 
proposition (3) and believes (1) to express that proposition (he mistakenly 
thinks that the man who will get the job is Jones) — he believes (1) to be true. 
And indeed (1) is true (hence the T: his 'belief is true'). Given the beliefs of the 
reader, her acceptance of (1) is equally legitimate. When the reader accepts 
(1) she believes both (2) and (4) which she knows to be expressed 
(ambiguously) by (1) — she has better information than Smith about who gets 
the job (required for (4)), and she also knows about the coins in Smith's 
pocket (required for both (4) and (2)). Yet Smith's belief (3) is a sufficient 
reason for his acceptance of (1). It is due to rashly identifying this belief in the 
truth of (1) with belief in what (1) expresses that Smith was therefore thought 
to believe (1) too (hence the B: 'belief'), and thus (2) (since (3) and (4) are 
clearly out for him). But acceptance is not an infallible guide to belief. The 
whole point of the present paper is to provide arguments showing that, in this 
case, Smith does not believe (1), and that Smith does not have JTB. It is 
Smith's acceptance of (1) that is mistaken and based on the 'wrong reasons' 
(his false belief (3)) – these still help to rationalise the problem. But Smith 
does not have the 'wrong reasons' for his belief in (1) since he does not 
believe (1) at all,22 even though he believes (1), the sentence, to be true.23  
 
 
VIII. JUSTIFICATION AND KNOWLEDGE. 
 
This is how the counterexample drives a wedge between the tripartite account 
and 'full justification': for the refutation of KJTB Smith's justification in 
'believing' (2) was taken to be his justification (what he would produce to 
justify himself if queried, i.e. his actual reason) for accepting (1). This is 
simply his false belief (3). The problem emerging then, and this is what gives 
rise to the air of paradox, is that given the beliefs of the reader Smith's 
                                                          
22 Of course Smith believes that there is someone who will get the job and has ten coins in 
his pocket, namely Jones; but it does not follow from that, nor is it true, that Smith believes 
that  x (x will get the job &  y (y will get the job Æ y=x) & x has ten coins in his pocket).   
23 It is possible to jokingly report Smith's mistaken belief by saying: 'Smith believes that 'the 
man who will get the job' has ten coins in his pocket', but note the inverted commas. This 
amounts to saying that 'Smith believes that the man whom Smith believes to be the man who 
will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.' Of course inverted commas are sometimes 
difficult to detect in belief reports, but anyway this is not the belief Gettier was talking about.   
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acceptance of (1) (which was identified with his belief in (1)), while 
understandable, does not appear altogether legitimate:24 it lacks 'full 
justification' since it 'does not stand up to the relevant set of facts' (Sturgeon 
1993) in some way that was (indeed, is) yet to be discovered. This 
manoeuvre provided some sort of evidence for the claim that the 'subjective' 
justification Smith had, while itself fine (that is to say, subjectively sufficient for 
acceptance of (1)), was not 'objectively' sufficient for full justification to know 
(1) because there clearly were relevant facts Smith simply had no idea 
about.25 Moreover Smith relied on falsities. 
 
The reader, of course, knows both (1) (the proposition) since she knows (2) 
and (4) (the propositions), and she knows (1) (the sentence) to be true since 
she also knows that (1) is true if taken to express (2) and (4). And, more to 
the point, she knows (1) (the sentence) to be true precisely because she 
knows (2) and (4) and knows that (1) expresses (2) and (4). Smith however 
thinks that (1) expresses (3), which is false; hence he merely believes the 
sentence to be true without believing what it expresses. Essentially the belief 
in the truth of (1) is the only thing Smith is right about.26 
 
The mythical 'full justification' Smith is lacking, I suggest, would only have 
been provided by the justification the reader has for accepting (1), i.e. the 
justification she would produce if queried (which is always undefeated) for her 
belief in the truth of (1). In this case, this would actually be knowledge of (2) 
and (4). But Smith, as we have already seen, does not even believe (2) or (4), 
let alone know them. Thus it is true that he does not have 'full justification' 
because he "does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and 
[because he] bases his belief in [(1)] on a count of the coins in Jones's 
pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job". That 
much we can accept. But we should not believe that this constitutes a 
counterexample to the tripartite account of knowledge.  
                                                          
24 Compare the analysis of Richman (1975, 438).  
25 By identifying acceptance with belief it also becomes understandable why this subjective 
justification was nonetheless held to be necessary for a full analysis of knowledge: unless 
Smith actually had some reason to accept (1) he would not have been thought to believe (1) 
at all.  
26 When Gettier asserts that condition ii) is satisfied by saying that "Smith believes it", it is 
ambiguous what the reference of 'it' is: typically it was read to refer to the preceding clause 
which states that (1) is true. Under this reading, Gettier's assertion is true, but irrelevant: 
Smith indeed believes that (1) is true – but to have JTB he should believe (1), which he does 
not. 'It' could also refer to (1) itself, as it should. Then, however, Gettier's assertion is false – 
Smith does not believe (1). Oddly enough, nowhere does Gettier literally say that Smith 
believes that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. 
 20
REFERENCES. 
 
1. Almeder, R. 1974: 'Truth and Evidence', Philosophical Quarterly 24, 365-
368. 
2. Almeder, R. 1975: 'Defending Gettier Counter-Examples', Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 53, 58-60. 
3. Almeder, R. 1976: 'On Seeing the Truth: A Reply', Philosophical Quarterly 
25, 163-165. 
4. Almeder, R. 1984: 'On Being Justified in Believing False Propositions', 
Philosophia 15, 271-285. 
5. Almeder, R. 1992: Blind Realism, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham.  
6. Bach, K. 1981: 'Referential/Attributive', Synthese 49, 219-244. 
7. Bach, K. 1987: Thought and Reference, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
8. Bach, K. 1997: 'Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs?', Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 78, 215-241. 
9. Clarke, D. S. 1994: 'Does Acceptance Entail Belief?', American 
Philosophical Quarterly 31, 145-155. 
10. Coder, D. 1970: 'Thalberg's Defense of Justified True Belief', The Journal 
of Philosophy 67, 424-425. 
11. Cohen, L. J. 1989: 'Belief and Acceptance', Mind 98, 367-389. 
12. Cohen, L. J. 1992: An Essay on Belief and Acceptance, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
13. Cohen, L. J. 1993: 'What has Probability to do with Strength of Belief', in 
Dubucs, J.-P. (ed.) 1993: Philosophy of Probability. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 
129-143. 
14. Dancy, J. 1985: Contemporary Epistemology, Oxford, Blackwell.  
15. De Sousa, R. B. 1971: 'How to Give a Piece of Your Mind', The Review of 
Metaphysics 25, 52-79. 
16. Donnellan, K. 1966: 'Reference and Definite Descriptions', The 
Philosophical Review 75, 281-304, reprinted in Martinich 1996, 231-243. 
17. Donnellan, K, 1967: 'Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again', The 
Philosophical Review 77, 203-215. 
18. Donnellan, K. 1977: 'Speaker Reference, Descriptions, and Anaphora', in 
French et al. 1977, 28-44. 
19. Donnellan, K. 1989: 'Belief and the Identity of Reference', in French et al. 
1989, 275-288.  
20. Dummett, M. A. E. 1999: 'Of What Kind of Thing is Truth a Property?', in 
Blackburn, S. and Simmons, K (eds.) 1999: Truth, Oxford Readings in 
Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 264-281.   
21. Evans, G. 1982: The Varieties of Reference, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
22. Feldman, R. 1974: 'An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples', 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52, 266-273. 
23. Fitch, G. W. 1976: 'Richman on the Principle of Deducibility for 
Justification', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6: 299-302. 
 21
24. French, P. A.; Uehling Jr., T. E.; Wettstein, H. K. (eds.) 1977: Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy II: Contemporary Perspectives on the Philosophy of 
Language. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. 
25. French, P. A.; Uehling Jr., T. E.; Wettstein, H. K. (eds.) 1989: Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy XIV: Contemporary Perspectives on the Philosophy 
of Language II. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame. 
26. Gettier, E. L. 1963: 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', Analysis 23, 121-
123, reprinted in Griffiths 1967, 144-146. 
27. Goldman, A. 1967: 'A Causal Theory of Knowing', The Journal of 
Philosophy 64, 357-72. 
28. Griffiths, A. P. (ed.) 1967: Knowledge and Belief, Oxford Readings in 
Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
29. Harman, G. 1966: 'New Implications of 'Someone' I', Analysis 26, 206. 
30. Hoffmann, W. E. 1975: 'Almeder on Truth and Evidence', Philosophical 
Quarterly 25, 59-61. 
31. Hooker, M. K. 1973: 'In Defense of the Principle For Deducibility of 
Justification'. Philosophical Studies 24, 402-406. 
32. Hornsby, J. 1977: 'Singular Terms in Contexts of Propositional Attitude', 
Mind 86, 31-48. 
33. Kripke, S. A. 1977: 'Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference', in 
French et al. 1977, 6-27.  
34. Kripke, S. A. 1979: 'A Puzzle About Belief', in Salmon and Soames 1988, 
102-148. Originally published in Margalit 1979, 239-283. 
35. Kripke, S. A. 1980: Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
36. Kuhn, S. T. 2000: 'Embedded Definite Descriptions: Russellian Analysis 
and Semantic Puzzles', Mind 109, 443-454. 
37. Lehrer, K. 1965: 'Knowledge, Truth, and Evidence', Analysis 25, 168-175. 
38. Lehrer, K. 1979: 'The Gettier Problem and the Analysis of Knowledge', in 
Pappas, G. S. (ed.) 1979: Justification and Knowledge, Reidel, Dordrecht. 
39. Lehrer, K. 1990: Theory of Knowledge, London: Westview/Routledge. 
40. Lehrer, K. 2000: 'Belief and Acceptance', in Engel, P. (ed.) 2000: Belief 
and Acceptance, Kluwer, Dordrecht.  
41. Lehrer, K. and Paxson Jr., T. 1969: 'Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True 
Belief', Journal of Philosophy 66, 225-237. 
42. MacKay, A. 1967: 'Mr. Donnellan and Humpty Dumpty On Referring', The 
Philosophical Review 77, 197-202. 
43. Margalit, A. (ed.) 1979: Meaning and Use, Reidel, Dordrecht. 
44. Marsh, R. C. (ed.) 1956: Bertrand Russell: Logic and Knowledge, George 
Allen & Unwin, London. 
45. Martinich, A. P. (ed.) 1996: The Philosophy of Language. Third Edition, 
Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford. 
46. McCulloch, G. 1989: The Game of the Name. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
47. Moore, J. 1994: 'Review of Cohen: An Essay on Belief and Acceptance', 
The Philosophical Review 102, 705-709.  
 22
48. Moore, J. G. 1999: 'Misdisquotation and Substitutivity: When Not to Infer 
Belief from Assent', Mind 108, 335-365. 
49. Neale, S. 1990: Descriptions, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and London, 
England. 
50. New, C. G. 1965: 'Some Implications of 'Someone'', Analysis 26, 62-64. 
51. New, C. G. 1968: ''Someone' Renewed', Analysis 28, 109-112. 
52. Nozick, R. 1981: Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
53. Perry, J. 1980: 'Belief and Acceptance', with postscript in his (1993): The 
Problem of the Essential Indexical, Oxford University Press, New York and 
Oxford, 53-68, originally in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980), 533-
42. 
54. Plantinga, A. 1993: Warrant: The Current Debate, Oxford University 
Press, New York and Oxford. 
55. Radford, C. 1990: 'Belief, Acceptance, and Knowledge', Mind 99, 609-617. 
56. Récanati, F. 1989: 'Referential Attributive: A Contextualist Proposal', 
Philosophical Studies 56, 217-249. 
57. Reimer, M. 1993: 'Russell's Anticipation of Donnellan's Distinction', 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71, 70-77. 
58. Reimer, M. 1998a: 'Donnellan's Distinction/Kripke's Test', Analysis 58, 89-
100. 
59. Reimer, M. 1998b: 'The Wettstein/Salmon Debate: Critique and 
Resolution', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79, 130-151. 
60. Richard, M. 1990: Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and 
How We Ascribe Them, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
61. Richman, R. J. 1975: 'Justified True Belief as Knowledge', Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 4, 435-439. 
62. Russell, B. 1905: 'On Denoting', Mind 14, 479-493, reprinted in Marsh 
(1956), 41-56, reprinted in Martinich (1996), 199-207. 
63. Russell, B. 1911: 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by 
Description', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11, reprinted in 
Salmon and Soames (1988), 16-32. 
64. Russell, B. 1912: The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
65. Russell, B. 1918: 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', The Monist, 
reprinted in March (1956), 177-281. 
66. Russell, B. 1919: Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. George Allen & 
Unwin, London, 167-180, as reprinted as 'Descriptions' in Martinich 
(1996), 208-214. 
67. Russell, B. 1957: 'Mr. Strawson on Referring', Mind 66, 385-389. 
68. Sainsbury, M. 1979: Russell. The Arguments of the Philosophers, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. 
69. Salmon, N. and Soames, S. (eds.) 1988: Propositions and Attitudes. 
Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
70. Saunders, J. T. 1973: 'Thalberg's Challenge to Justification via Deduction', 
Philosophical Studies 23, 358-364. 
 23
71. Searle, J. 1979: 'Referential and Attributive', The Monist 62, 191-208. Also 
in his (1979): Expression and Meaning, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 137-161. 
72. Sesonske, A. 1959: 'On Believing', Journal of Philosophy 56, 486-492. 
73. Shope, R. K. 1983: The Analysis of Knowing, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
74. Smith, J. M. 1966: 'New Implications of 'Someone' II', Analysis 26, 207-
208. 
75. Strawson, P. F. 1950: 'On Referring', Mind 59, 320-344, reprinted in 
Martinich (1996), 215-230. 
76. Sturgeon, S. 1991: 'Truth in Epistemology', Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 51, 99-108 
77. Sturgeon, S. 1993: 'The Gettier Problem', Analysis 53, 156-164. 
78. Suppe, F. 1972: 'Misidentification, Truth and Knowing That', Philosophical 
Studies 23, 186-197. 
79. Thalberg, I. 1969: 'In Defense of Justified True Belief', The Journal of 
Philosophy 66, 795-803. 
80. Thalberg, I. 1974: 'Is Justification Transmissible through Deduction?', 
Philosophical Studies 25, 347-356. 
81. Ullmann-Margalit, E. and Margalit, A. 1992: 'Holding True and Holding As 
True', Synthese 92, 167-187. 
82. Wettstein, H. 1981: 'Demonstrative Reference and Definite Descriptions', 
Philosophical Studies 40, 241-257. As reprinted in his (1991): Has 
Semantics Rested on a Mistake?, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 35-
49. 
 
 24
